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GUILDS
AT
THE
MILLENNIUM:
ANTITRUST AND THE PROFESSIONS
ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE ASSOCIATION

OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, SECTION ON
ANTITRUST AND ECONOMIC REGULATION

Introduction
Susan Beth Farmer*

The papers published in this symposium issue were originally
presented at the meeting of the Section on Antitrust and Economic
Regulation of the Association of American Law Schools ("AALS"),
at the Association Annual Conference, held January 2 - 6, 2002, in
New Orleans, Louisiana. The audience for this conference is

academics who research, teach and write in the area of antitrust and
competition law, business regulation or economics, rather than legal
practitioners or members of the various professions that are the
subject of these articles. The papers that follow, however, are not
solely theoretical or limited to a law and economics analysis, but
analyze the role of competition among professionals in three concrete
factual scenarios. Section Chair, Professor Spencer Weber Waller'
* Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of
Law.
B.A. Wellesley College, J.D. Vanderbilt Law School. I would like to thank
Professor Spencer Weber Waller, of Loyola University Chicago Law School and
chair of the AALS Section on Antitrust and Economic Regulation for 2001, for
facilitating the planning and organization of this program as well as the Section's
activities, and Professor Barbara Ann White of the University of Baltimore School
of Law for organizing the program and serving as one of the commentators.
Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies,
Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Professor Waller is a prolific antitrust
scholar and frequent lecturer who also teaches civil procedure and various courses
in international business law. He has taught and served as Associate Dean at
Brooklyn Law School. He clerked with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit and is a former attorney with the United States Department of
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describes the subject of the program, "the inherent conflict between
self-regulation of the professions and its potential abuse for anticompetitive purposes," as both a longstanding and important issue,
recognizing that "the key question is whether a profession's selfregulation serves the public interest in preserving professional quality
or is a means to exclude competition and/or maintain anticompetitive prices." 2 This topic is particularly timely in light of the
1999 Supreme Court decision in California Dental Ass'n v. FTC,3 a
government case challenging a non-profit association of dental
societies ethical rules limiting advertising by member dentists, and
the announcement by newly appointed Federal Trade Commission
Chair Timothy Muris that investigation of unfair methods of
competition by professionals would be an enforcement priority of the
Commission under his leadership.
The overall theme of the AALS program was an examination
of the state of competition in aspects of three different professions:
the practice and business of medicine, legal education, and the
practice of antitrust law. In addition to their focus on different
professions, the three speakers took diverse approaches to their
general topic. Professor Stephen Calkins 5 examines the legal
Justice, Antitrust and Criminal Divisions. He received his B.A. from the University
of Michigan and J.D. from Northwestern University School of Law.
2 Spencer Weber Waller, Annual Newsletter (AALS, Section on Antitrust and
Economic Regulation), Nov. 2001, at 1 (on file with the Consumer Law Review).
3 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
4 Timothy J. Muris, FTC Chairman, Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal

Trade Commission: In a Word - Continuity, Aug. 7, 2001 (Before the Antitrust
Section Annual Meeting in Chicago, IL, Chairman Muris stated, "[i]t is
uncontroversial that horizontal activities should be a major focus of non-merger
enforcement. You can be sure that we are going to be very active in finding,
investigating, and bringing actions against anticompetitive horizontal activities. We
already have a number of new initiatives under way. The professions and health
care are areas of particular interest."), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/
murisaba.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2002).
5 Professor of Law at the Wayne State University Law School, where he has
also served as Interim Dean. Professor Calkins teaches antitrust and trade
regulation as well as courses on consumer law, corporations, and torts. He served
as General Counsel of the Federal Trade Commission from 1995 to 1997, having
been nominated by then-Chairman Robert Pitofsky. Professor Calkins is a
committee chair and former Council member of the American Bar Association
Section of Antitrust Law, and currently serves on the Council of the ABA Section
of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice. He is also a member of the
American Law Institute and a former chair of the AALS Antitrust and Economic
Regulation Committee. A prolific scholar and lecturer on competition law and
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profession, with a particular focus on antitrust lawyers and their preeminent professional association, the Section of Antitrust Law of the
American Bar Association. Taking a retrospective view in this the
50th anniversary of the Section, Professor Calkins assumes the role
of story-teller to provide a lively and engaging view of the Section's
members, leaders, and activities over the years. He describes lawyers
meeting and working together in the context of a trade association,
sometimes in agreement and sometimes at odds with one another, as
they pursue a variety of goals. The ABA Antitrust Section members
were engaged in professional development and training in the form of
continuing legal education ("CLE") programs and publication of
comprehensive treatises long before any of the state bar licensing
associations began to impose CLE requirements. In addition to this
non-controversial role, the Section has actively sought to influence
the development of law by adopting policy positions and providing
testimony on proposed antitrust legislation before Congressional
committees, submission of briefs amicus curiae in selected cases, and
continuing dialogue with enforcement officials from the U.S.
Department of Justice, Federal Trade Commission, and more
including, among others,
enforcers
international
recently,
representatives from the European Union.
Professor Peter Hammer, 6 also speaking metaphorically,
considers the relationship between physicians and hospitals as part of
the fabled story of vertical agreements. Importantly, Professor
Hammer identifies a critical development in the antitrust law
surrounding doctors, and by extension all professionals, as the
evolution from analysis based on their status to one based on the
contractual aspects of the relationship. The relationship between
doctors and hospitals, he argues, can be analogized to the vertical
relationship between producers and distributors. This article
elaborates on the strengths and limitations of that fable, supported
with original empirical research into modem judicial treatment of
antitrust litigation between physicians and hospitals. Ultimately, he
concludes that the vertical relationship analogy, however flawed, is
policy (most recently in Indonesia), he has taught at the Universities of Michigan,
Pennsylvania, and Utrecht (The Netherlands). Professor Calkins received his J.D.
from Harvard University and B.A. from Yale University.
6 Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Law School. Professor Hammer
received his J.D. and Doctorate in Economics from the University of Michigan. A
recipient of a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Health Policy Investigator Award,
Professor Hammer's scholarship interest involves antitrust law and the health care
industry. He is also the founder and director of the Program for Cambodian Law
and Development at the University of Michigan.
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useful because it moves courts further in the direction of sound
economic analysis of exclusive contract issues over historic statusbased rules. The precise content of the economic analysis, identifying
and weighing competitive benefits against harms, remains to be
theorized, but Professor Hammer points the direction.
Professor Marina Lao 7 has studied various aspects of
competition and legal education in her previous work. 8 For this
program, she focuses on law school accreditation and the role of the
American
Bar Association
as
an important participant,
notwithstanding its status as a private actor.9 Any restriction on entry
into a profession has the potential to cause anticompetitive effects as
well as pro-competitive benefits, such as quality certification and
provision of valuable information not easily obtained or interpreted
by non-professionals. However, there have been relatively few
antitrust challenges to the ABA's role in law school accreditation,
which Professor Lao describes as especially curious given the rather
large number of antitrust challenges to analogous situations in the
medical field, primarily involving physician allegations of illegal
boycott exclusive contracting cases or adverse peer review decisions.
The explanation, she posits, is the belief that law school accreditation
is exempt from antitrust condemnation under the state action 10 or

7 Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law, where she teaches and

writes in the antitrust area, and also teaches courses in commercial law,
corporations, securities regulation, and torts. She is a former Trial Attorney with
the United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, having served in both
the Atlanta and Washington, D.C. offices of the Division. Professor Lao has also
taught at the University of Connecticut and Temple University Law School. She
received her B.A. from SUNY at Stony Brook, her J.D. from Albany Law School,
Union University, and her L.L.M. from Temple University Law School.
8 See Marina Lao, Discrediting Accreditation?: Antitrust and Legal
Education, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1035 (2001).
9 ABA approval is not technically mandatory for law schools, but is required
as a practical matter because only graduates of ABA approved law schools are
permitted to sit for the state bar exam in more than 4 out of 5 American
jurisdictions.
'0 See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.

97, 97 (1980) (holding that the two elements of antitrust immunity under the state
action doctrine are that "the challenged restraint [must] be 'one clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed as state policy... .' and "the policy [must] be 'actively
supervised' by the state itself...."); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621,
634-35 (1992) (further defining the active supervision requirement to require the
exercise of judgment and actual deliberation by the state rather than ratification of
agreements among the private parties that are the subject of regulation.).

2002]

Guilds at the Millennium: Introduction

381

Noerr 1 doctrines. This article analyzes the reach of these two
immunity doctrines and concludes that the standards per se do not
have antitrust immunity but their use, when mandated by states, as a
gatekeeper to the practice of law, enjoys immunity. First Amendment
principles, 12 she argues, do not offer a perfect analogy because the
accreditation standards and process are not properly characterized as
pure speech. Finally, moving from theory to application, the article
raises, but does not decide today, whether the law school
accreditation standards are unlawful under substantive antitrust
standards.
Thus, all of these papers present creative new approaches to
longstanding issues surrounding antitrust treatment of professionals
and leave the reader with provocative questions. 1 3 Future articles

11See E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961); UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian
Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
12 See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). A
group of trial lawyers in the District of Columbia engaged in a boycott, refusing to
accept appointments to represent indigent criminal defendants in the D.C. Superior
Court until the D.C. government increased their compensation. The FTC filed a
complaint under section 5 of the FTC Act, alleging that the trial lawyers' actions
constituted an unlawful boycott and agreement to fix prices, and found that the
activity violated section 5. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia vacated and remanded, stating that "the SCTLA boycott did contain an
element of expression warranting First Amendment protection." 856 F.2d 226, 248
(1998), rev'd in part by 493 U.S. 411 (1990). Because of the First Amendment
implications, the Court of Appeals refused to apply the per se rule, stating that
"[w]e hold only that the evidentiary shortcut to antitrust condemnation without
proof of market power is inappropriate as applied to a boycott that served, in part,
to make a statement on a matter of public debate." Id. at 250. Moreover, ". . .our
evaluation of the petitioners' conduct is not unaffected by the special concern of the
First Amendment with efforts to petition the government for redress of one's
grievances." Id. Reversing, the Supreme Court rejected the purported justification
that higher prices promote high quality professional services, stating: "It is, of
course, true that the city purchases respondents' services because it has a
constitutional duty to provide representation to indigent defendants. It is likewise
true that the quality of representation may improve when rates are increased. Yet
neither of these facts is an acceptable justification for an otherwise unlawful
restraint of trade." 493 U.S. at 423. On the First Amendment issue, the Court
distinguished between the protected acts of publicizing the alleged problem of
excessively low compensation and lobbying the government for change, on the one
hand, and the unprotected concerted action for their own economic benefit. Id. at
425-28.
13 Two commentators have expanded their remarks for this symposium.
Professor Thomas Greaney is Professor of Law and co-director of the Center for
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promise to add content to theory, elaborate on methodology, and
guide scholars and courts in the application of substantive standards
to balance the economic and competitive benefits and harms of
competition among professionals.
The issue of competition and self regulation by professionals
actually involves several subsidiary questions, including: whether the
practice of a profession even constitutes "trade or commerce" within
the meaning of the Sherman Act; 14 what constitutes a profession and,
subsidiarily, the meaning of "practice" of a profession; whether and
under what circumstances state regulation of professions and
professional associations is exempt from the antitrust laws; and
finally, whether professionals are subject to different substantive
antitrust standards in any circumstances, in other words, whether
professionals enjoy special antitrust treatment solely by virtue of their
status. These are not easy questions and the correct resolutions are, in
many respects, not intuitively obvious. It is well established,
however, that competition, whether for services or goods, is a
fundamental goal of antitrust, and agreements to fix prices or restrict
output are, and ought to be, subject to condemnation.
Health Law Studies at St. Louis University. He is the author of the West treatise
HEALTH LAW and the textbook HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS
(4th ed.) and is co-editor in chief of the Journal of Health Law, published by the
American Health Lawyers Association. Before joining the faculty, he was assistant
chief of the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, supervising health care
antitrust litigation. He has served as a Victor Kramer Fellow Yale University, a
fellow at the Yale Institute for Social and Policy Studies, and a Fulbright Fellow
studying competition law at the EC Commission in Brussels. He received his B.A.
from Wesleyan University and his J.D. from Harvard Law School. Professor
Barbara White is a member of the faculty of the University of Baltimore School of
Law. She received her B.A. from Hunter College, her Ph.D. in Economics from
Cornell University, and her J.D. from SUNY-Buffalo, where she was also an
Assistant Professor of Economics. She has also taught at the University of Houston
and Connecticut law schools, and in Economics at Wisconsin.
14 Sherman Act § 1 provides that "[e]very contract, combination .., or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (emphasis added). Section
2 of the Sherman Act provides: "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... 15 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis
added).
15 United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 577 (1898); United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940) ("Any combination
which tampers with price structures is engaged in an unlawful activity. Even
though the members of the price-fixing group were in no position to control the
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Initially, there was a genuine question whether the antitrust6
laws were intended to reach the so-called learned professions.'
Although the antitrust laws had been applied to professionals, for
much of the history of the antitrust laws, the Court was able to avoid
deciding whether Congress had originally intended to extend the
Sherman Act to the practice of a profession per se.17 This clearly was
a potential issue of great significance, given the importance of health
care markets in the modem economy and the antitrust issues
presented by licensing and accreditation, exclusive contracting,
mergers and acquisitions, and a variety of emerging managed care
market, to the extent that they raised, lowered, or stabilized prices they would be
directly interfering with the free play of market forces. The -Act places all such
schemes beyond the pale."); Broad. Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S.
1, 7 n.10 (1979) (rejecting per se rule of illegality because blanket licensing in
essence creates new product and is not a naked restraint); Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984) (finding NCAA rule
anticompetitive and unlawful because it raised prices and limited output although
not applying the per se rule).
16 United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 492 (1950)
(rejecting exemption for real estate brokers whose "activity is commercial and
carried on for profit" but reserving issue of whether "professions" are engaged in
trade within the meaning of the Act.). See also Fed. Club v. Nat'l League, 259 U.S.
200, 209 (1922) (stating that "a firm of lawyers sending out a member to argue a
case.. .does not engage in.. .commerce" simply because the attorney travels across
state borders); FTC v. Raladam, 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931) (action under FTC Act
§ 5 for unfair competition against sellers of claimed diet remedy, Justice Sutherland
commented that "medical practitioners... are not in competition with respondent.
They follow a profession and not trade, and are not engaged in the business of
making or vending remedies but in prescribing them."); At. Cleaners & Dyers v.
United States, 286 U.S. 427, 436 (1932) (antitrust action against dry cleaning and
laundry business that claimed that it was provided services and therefore was not
engaged in 'trade or commerce' as required for Sherman Act jurisdiction, the Court
construed 'trade' broadly, citing with approval the language from Nymph, below).
See generally Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506, 507, 1 Sumn. 516 (Cir. Ct. D. Me. 1834) (in
a case involving seizure of a schooner for violation of its fishing license, Circuit
Justice Story construed the Coasting and Fishery Act of 1793, to determine whether
mackerel fishery is a "trade" under the Act, stating that "the word 'trade' is often,
and indeed generally, used in a broader sense, as equivalent to occupation,
employment, or business, whether manual or mercantile. Wherever any occupation,
employment, or business is carried on for the purpose of profit, or gain or a
livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in the learned professions, it is constantly
called a trade.") (emphasis added).
17 Am. Med. Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943) (holding that
doctors and two medical associations were subject to indictment and conviction for
ethical rules that resulted in boycott of pre-paid group health membership
organization but finding it unnecessary to decide whether the practice of medicine
is trade or commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Act).
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models in the health care field. The question was finally resolved in
1975 by Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, a case challenging
minimum fee schedules of lawyers. There, the State bar association
was found to effectively enforce the fee schedules of a voluntary
local bar association, which lacked formal authority to enforce the
minimum fee schedules, through the State Bar's prohibition and
definition of unethical practice. The County bar association argued
that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to cover 'learned
professions." 9 Finding no support for that assertion, the Court
announced broadly that:
The nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not
provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act, nor is the publicservice aspect of professional practice controlling in
determining whether s 1 includes professions. Congress
intended to strike as broadly as it could in s 1 of the
Sherman Act, and to read into it so wide an exemption as

18

421 U.S. 773, 780 (1975) (the Court described itself as "confronted for the

first time with the question of whether the Sherman Act applies to services
performed by attorneys in examining titles in connection with financing the
purchase of real estate.").
19 The Court found that the justifications for adoption of the minimum fee
schedules were not entirely to enhance professionalism. In an argument that
extends to the earliest Sherman Act cases, and has been virtually uniformly
rejected, the Court quoted a minimum fee schedule Report to the effect that
"lawyers have slowly, but surely, been committing economic suicide as a
profession." Id. at 787 n.16. But crisis cartels have long been rejected as a
legitimate justification for price fixing. See Ariz. v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y,
457 U.S. 332, 346 (1985); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'I Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679, 696 (1978) ("The Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the
assumption that competition itself is unreasonable."); United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) ("[F]or over forty years this Court has
consistently and without deviation adhered to the principle that price-fixing
agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and that no showing of socalled competitive abuses or evils which those agreements were designed to
eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense."). But see Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933) (The objectives of the
Sherman Act "call for vigilance in the detection and frustration of all efforts unduly
to restrain the free course of interstate commerce, but they do not seek to establish a
mere delusive liberty either by making impossible the normal and fair expansion of
that commerce or the adoption of reasonable measures to protect it from injurious
and destructive practices and to promote competition upon a sound basis."
(emphasis added).
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2
that urged on us would be at odds with that purpose. 0

Following Goldfarb, business transactions involving services
in general, and sales of professional services in particular, clearly
constitute the "trade" required for antitrust jurisdiction and are
entitled to no broad antitrust exemption. 2 1 This is an altogether
salutary rule since the concept of "professional" or "learned
profession" has not been adequately defined. The natural inclination
of competitors is to seek to define themselves as "professionals" and,
concomitantly, to seek state licensing and regulation to limit entry
into their field. For example, the Pennsylvania Department of State,
at last count, regulated some twenty-seven boards and commissions
of professions and occupations, including: accountants, architects,
engineers, doctors, nurses, dentists, and pharmacists, but also
auctioneers, barbers, cosmetologists, not to mention funeral directors
and vehicle dealers and salespeople. 22 This is illustrative of the
potential for regulation of "professionals" to swamp the field.
As a fundamental antitrust principle, it is non-controversial
that competition is preferred over government regulation, even when
the product is professional services. 23 However, principles of
federalism also require due deference to appropriate governmental
decisions in favor of regulation. Accordingly, antitrust immunity
doctrines have been developed to immunize activities that would
constitute cartels if adopted solely by private actors, if they are
subject to appropriate levels of oversight and regulation. The
intricacies of the state action and Noerr-Pennington immunity
doctrines are beyond the scope of this introduction, but the basic
contours can be quickly sketched.
It is well-accepted that Congress did not seek to regulate the
anticompetitive actions of government. 24 States and their entities are
20

Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 787 (citations omitted).

2i

Id. at 787-88 ("Indeed, our cases have specifically included the sale of

services within [§]1. Whatever else it may be, the examination of a land title is a
service; the exchange of such a service for money is 'commerce' in the most
common usage of that word. It is no disparagement of the practice of law as a
profession to acknowledge that it has this business aspect, and [§]1 of the Sherman
Act .... ).
22 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Department of State, available at http://www.dos.

state.pa.us/bpoa/bpoa.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
23 Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977) (state bar prohibition
of advertising by lawyers invalidated).
24 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (California adopted legislation
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themselves immune from antitrust penalties, but they cannot merely
authorize private parties to fix prices or otherwise violate the
competition laws.25 State action immunity has evolved into a two-part
test, "[fWirst, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed as state policy'; second, the policy must
be 'affirmatively supervised' by the State itself., 26 Professionals,
may, but are not necessarily entitled to, state action immunity. 27 The
authorizing a commission to regulate raisin marketing, including limiting
production and maintaining prices. The State was immune from antitrust challenge
because "[t]he Sherman Act makes no mention of the state as such, and gives no
hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a
state."). The Court stated:
We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history
which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or
agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of
government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign,
save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their
authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its
officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.
Parker,317 U.S. at 350-5 1.
25 Id. This is the case whether or not the State participates in an alleged
conspiracy. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 374
(1991). However, whether a State becomes liable by acting as a market participant
rather than solely in a regulatory capacity is another issue, as yet undecided by the
Supreme Court. Lower courts that have considered the question have rejected such
a market participant exception to state action immunity. See, e.g., Endsley v. City
of Chicago, 230 F.3d 276, 285 (7th Cir. 2000) (no need to reach antitrust state
action defense, market participant defense discussed under Commerce Clause);
Paragould Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Paragould, 930 F.2d 1310, 1313 (8th Cir.
1991) ("The market participant exception is merely a suggestion and is not a rule of
law. Until such a transformation occurs, we will continue to use the necessary and
reasonable test established by this circuit.").
26 Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105 (1980). Elaboration of these standards has followed. A state policy that
expressly permits, without compelling or specifically detailing, anticompetitive
regulation, satisfies the clear articulation standard. S. Motor Carriers Rate
Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 61 (1985). Neither compulsion nor
active supervision are required for municipal regulations. Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45-46 (1985). Recoveries in private plaintiffs' actions against
local government officials are limited to injunctive relief. Local Government
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 35 - 36 (2002). Active supervision requires that "the
State has exercised sufficient independent judgment and control so that the details
[of the regulation] have been established as a product of deliberate state
intervention, not simply by agreement among private parties." FTC v. Ticor Title
Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 634-35 (1992).
27 See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 102-03 (1988). A hospital peer
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Noerr-Pennington doctrine will not be discussed here as it receives
full treatment in Professor Lao's paper.
Professional associations, as well as other self regulatory
groups and trade associations, have a legitimate role in promoting
efficient, ethical practice, and therefore are in the public interest. This
does not necessarily imply that a different substantive standard is
appropriate, but the Court has in various cases strongly suggested that
professionals are entitled to be judged under a different antitrust
standard. In Goldfarb, the professionals were lawyers who adhered to
a minimum fee schedule indirectly enforced by the Virginia State Bar
Association. 28 Although holding that the minimum fee schedule was
a naked restraint, the Court was moderately deferential to the
association of professionals, suggesting that a broader analysis than
the per se rule was required and that courts should consider 29noneconomic factors in evaluating restraints of trade in this context.
Similarly, a trade association of professional engineers
advanced related arguments, claiming that agreements by
professionals that are designed to protect health and safety should not
be condemned as per se unlawful. 3° While not clear whether the case
review committee of doctors were not entitled to state action immunity, not because
of their status as physicians, but because the state of Oregon merely regulated the
peer review process and did not have the power to overturn actual peer review
decisions, and limited judicial review was not sufficient to meet the requirement of
active supervision.
28 421 U.S. at 773.
Id. at 787 (Stating that "[t]he nature of an occupation, standing alone, does
not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act,.. nor is the public-service aspect of
professional practice controlling in determining whether [§] 1 includes
professions.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Court did note, however,
that:
29

It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as
interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to
apply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other
areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the professions,
may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed
as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated
differently.
Id. at 788 n.17. The following year, disciplinary rules prohibiting advertising by
lawyers were invalidated under the First Amendment, in a case holding that the
rules were immune from antitrust scrutiny under the state action doctrine. Bates,
433 U.S. at 362-63.
'0Profl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 684-85. The Engineers' ethics rules prohibited
competitive bidding. Upon Justice Department challenge, the Society justified the
rules on the basis that it was a learned profession and had adopted the rules to
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was decided under the per se rule or a more expansive rule of
reason, 31 the Court firmly rejected the health and welfare
justification.32 The Court was not so clear on the standard to govern
professionals, 33 explicitly allowing that the public service aspect of
the profession could, in the appropriate fact situation, lead to a
different result than would obtain with an ordinary business.
prevent competition solely on price, which could lead to substandard work, risky
practices to shave costs and increase profits, dangerous engineering, to the ultimate
danger to the public.
31 The Court describes Sherman analysis as unitary, involving two
complementary categories: a per se category and a more searching rule of reason
analysis, all part of a rule of reason. The actual case analysis states that "[w]hile
this is not price fixing as such, no elaborate industry analysis is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement." Id. at 692. The
case then proceeds to analyze the workings of the ban on competitive bidding in a
more detailed fashion than would be expected in a per se case. Catalano,Inc. v.
Target Sales, Inc., appears to characterize Professional Engineers as a per se case,
"[t]hus, we have held agreements to be unlawful per se that had substantially less
direct impact on price than the agreement alleged in this case... an agreement
among competing firms of professional engineers to refuse to discuss prices with
potential customers until after negotiations have resulted in the initial selection of
an engineer was held unlawful without requiring further inquiry." 446 U.S. 643,
647 (1980) (citing Prof' Engineers, 435 U.S. at 692-93).
32 Prof'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 694-95. The Court stated:
The Sherman Act does not require competitive bidding; it prohibits
unreasonable restraints on competition. Petitioner's ban on competitive
bidding prevents all customers from making price comparisons in the
initial selection of an engineer, and imposes the Society's views of the
costs and benefits of competition on the entire marketplace. It is this
restraint that must be justified under the Rule of Reason, and
petitioner's attempt to do so on the basis of the potential threat that
competition poses to the public safety and the ethics of its profession is
nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman
Act. (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
33 Id. at 686-87. The Court stated:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished
from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that
particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to
view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business
activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust
concepts which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and
other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice,
which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in
another context, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any
other situation than the one with which we are confronted today.
(emphasis added).
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Unfortunately, the Court failed to explain when and under what
circumstances this special deference might apply, nor the specifics of
any such analysis.
Four years later, the Court in Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Society had no trouble applying the per se rule to an
agreement by participating doctors to accept maximum insurance
payments as their full fee, in a case that appears to present some
compelling efficiency justifications for the practice. 34 Without
explicitly overruling the Goldfarb and Professional Engineers dicta,
the Court severely limited it to situations in which "the quality of the
professional service that their members provide is enhanced by the
price restraint," 35 yet public welfare and safety do not justify
horizontal price agreements by professionals. 36 The paradigm case
that appears crafted to fit within this narrow37 window, however,
refused to apply a relaxed rule for professionals.
In Superior Court Trial Lawyers, an association of lawyers,
who served as court-appointed counsel for indigent criminal
defendants, sought to persuade the District of Columbia government
to increase their fees from $30 per hour for time spent in court and
$20 per hour for out-of-court work in 1983, all the way up to the
magnificent sum of $55 per hour for in-court and $45 per hour for
out-of-court work. 38 The method chosen to achieve this result was an
agreement, put into practice by about 90% of the approximately 100

457 U.S. at 349. The defendant doctors had argued that, under the Goldfarb
dicta, their status as professionals should allow the agreement to escape
condemnation under the per se rule. Rejecting the invitation, the Court stated:
14

The price-fixing agreements in this case... are not premised on public
service or ethical norms. The respondents do not argue, as did the
defendants in Goldfarb and Professional Engineers, that the quality of
the professional service that their members provide is enhanced by the
price restraint. The respondents' claim for relief from the per se rule is
simply that the doctors' agreement not to charge certain insureds more
than a fixed price facilitates the successful marketing of an attractive
insurance plan. But the claim that the price restraint will make it easier
for customers to pay does not distinguish the medical profession from
any other provider of goods or services.
35 Id. (emphasis added).
36

Prof1 Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695-96.

3' FFC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,431-32 (1990).
38

Importantly, the Court points out the lack of support in the record for the

proposition that the low fees caused either a shortage of court-appointed lawyers or
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 416
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lawyers who regularly participated in these appointments, to decline
any further appointments until the government agreed to raise
attorney's fees at a cost of $4 million to $5 million per year, which it
did roughly two weeks later. 39 In its complaint, the FTC characterized
the agreement as a horizontal conspiracy to boycott and fix prices.4n
The Court assumed for the purpose of discussion that:
Respondents' boycott may well have served a cause that
was worthwhile and unpopular. We may assume that the
preboycott rates were unreasonably low, and that the
increase has produced better legal representation for
indigent defendants. Moreover, given that neither indigent
criminal defendants nor the lawyers who represent them
command any special appeal with the electorate, we may
also assume that without the boycott there would have been
no increase in District CJA fees at least until the Congress
amended the federal statute.41
It is difficult to imagine any case tailored to fit better within
the narrow professional limitation to the per se rule articulated in
Maricopathan that presented by these facts; the argument is precisely
that the quality of their professional representation, and the public
service function of provision of legal services for indigent criminal
defendants, are enhanced by the agreement on prices. Nevertheless,
the Court found the agreement to be the "essence" of price fixing,
"unquestionably a naked restraint" designed to increase prices for the
lawyers' personal benefit by means of a concerted boycott, whether
or not they possessed market power, and per se unlawful. 42 To the
extent that a relaxed substantive antitrust rule ever genuinely existed
for professionals,43 after Trial Lawyers, the successful case is the
39 Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. at 416, 420.
40

Id. at 418.

41

Id. at 421.

42 Id. at 423. The Court decided that the attorneys were essentially asking it to
find the activity legal because the prices were fair, never a defense to price fixing,
and moreover, "[tihe social justifications proffered for respondents' restraint of
trade.. .do not make it any less unlawful." Id. at 424.
43 See Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788-89 n.17:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished
from a business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that
particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to
view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other business
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unicorn of antitrust law, a fabled beast never clearly seen but able to
make mischief by distracting courts from the central focus of the
competition inquiry. As Professor Hammer persuasively argues,
cases involving professionals should be decided on their economic
impact, weighing the procompetitive virtues of an agreement or
ethical rule against the anticompetitive harms threatened. Adding an
additional factor of professional status to the analysis adds little and
increases the risk that decisions in antitrust cases against
professionals will be incoherent and unpredictable.
Thus, CaliforniaDental is only the most recent in a long line
of Supreme Court cases recognizing the importance of competition
even among licensed professionals who seek to impose regulations
on their competitor-colleagues. In the case, the FTC challenged an
ethical rule by a non-profit association of dental societies with more
than 1900 dentist members that prohibited false and misleading
advertisements, and which had been interpreted by the association as
severely limiting claims about discount prices and quality of
services. 44 While the Commission found the practice illegal per se, or
in the alternative, illegal under an abbreviated rule of reason, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the conclusion while finding that a rule of
reason analysis was required and met by the Commission's "quick
look" analysis. 45 Although the majority referred yet again to the
Goldfarb decision and quoted footnote 17, panelist Professor Calkins
has described the opinion as "evinc[ing] extraordinary antipathy
towards professional advertising" 46 and ultimately "essential to an
understanding of its opinion. 4 7 While not adopting a special standard
for professionals, the majority opinion cited a variety of studies
concerning advertising specifically for professional services,
including the problems of confusion and inadequate information,48
pointing out that the concurrence discussion of the Ninth Circuit
activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust
concepts which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and
other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice,
which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in
another context, be treated differently.
44 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 762 (1999).
Id. at 763.
46 Stephen Calkins, CaliforniaDentalAssociation: Not A Quick Look But Not

45

The Full Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495, 510 (2000).

47

ld.at 5 18.

48 Cal. Dental,526 U.S. at 771-73.
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opinion "brush[es] over the professional context and describe[s] no
anticompetitive effects. . . .,,9 The majority's conclusion, that the
Court of Appeals had failed to more thoroughly weigh the
anticompetitive as compared to procompetitive effects of the rule, is
inconsistent, in Professor Calkins's view, with the decision that
would have obtained had the product involved advertising of a
commodity rather than professional services. 50 Therefore, here the
special standard for professionals appears to cut against the
challenged conduct rather than providing additional protection from
antitrust liability that might not be available to defendants engaged in
ordinary business. On the substantive side, if the case can be divorced
from its factual setting, the Court does not adopt a new rule; it neither
requires a full rule of reason nor adopts market power screens, rather
it makes more explicit the understanding of a rule of reason as a
sliding scale with per
se analysis on one side and a full rule of reason
51
inquiry on the other.
The theme that emerges from the articles that follow is the
increasing sophistication of antitrust law in cases affecting
professionals: importing reasoning from roughly analogous vertical
restraints fact patterns into cases involving medical professional
contracting and managed care plans, and thoughtful application of the
traditional antitrust exemption doctrines in reviewing standards for
professional education. For the future, these papers point the way to
thoughtful consideration the particular competitive effects of any
practice involving professionals rather than blind deference to their
status.

49 Cal. Dental, 526

U.S. at 774.
50 Calkins, supra note 46, at 518.
51Justice Breyer, concurring, adds content to the majority's conclusion that
"there is generally no categorical line to be drawn between restraints that give rise
to an intuitively obvious inference of anticompetitive effects and those that call for
more detailed treatment. What is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for the case,
looking to the circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint." Cal. Dental, 526
U.S. at 780-81. Justice Breyer would "break [the] question [whether the restraint at
issue is anticompetitive] down into four classical, subsidiary antitrust questions: (1)
What is the specific restraint at issue? (2) What are its likely anticompetitive
effects? (3) Are there offsetting procompetitive justifications? (4) Do the parties
have sufficient market power to make a difference?" Id. at 782.

